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Abstract We examine aspects of labor in the harvesting sector of the surf
clam/ocean quahog industry of the mid-Atlantic region of the United States in the
context of limited entry. Vessel owners are both diversifying and cutting back on
labor costs through crew consolidation in response to difficulties in the sea clam
industry. A survey of crew-members on job satisfaction reveals more about the
preferences and experiences of labor. We make predictions about the fate of labor
under a new management regime based on individual transferable quotas. The
analysis is intended to bring the interests of crew-members into the
decision-making process and to improve the basis for predicting how future
regulatory measures may affect crewing.
Keywords Fishery management, labor, crewing, Atlantic sea clams, limited entry,
social impact.
Introduction
Limited entry and, particularly, the quasi-privatization created by individual transferable
quotas, are widely advocated ways to achieve resource conservation with minimal eco-
nomic waste or inefficiency. Because these techniques are new in the United States, little
is known about their effects on firms in fisheries (see DeWees 1989, for an analysis
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of early effects in New Zealand fisheries). Our concern is with their effects on workers
in those firms, which we have narrowed to crew members (deckhands, mates, and
captains) on fishing vessels.
Entry into the mid-Atlantic federal fishery for surf clams has been restricted through
a vessel moratorium since 1977. This study addresses the labor process under that
regime, particularly in recent years when the number of allowable fishing days has been
sharply curtailed. Students of the labor process emphasize technological change and how
it affects the nature of work and the composition and differentiation of the working class
(Braverman 1974). We focus on regulatory rather than technological change and offer a
narrower set of observations on the labor process.
The present study provides background to analysis of the social consequences of
another regulatory regime, that of quasi-privatization under individual transferable quo-
tas. In October 1989, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council voted to amend the
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery management plan by replacing the vessel
moratorium and time-based indirect allocation system with an individual transfer quota
(ITQ) system. The ITQ system is intended to rationalize the fishery by allowing it to
operate at the lowest possible cost (for example, fishing effort, administration, and
enforcement) for a particular level of catch ..." (MAFAC 1988: 14), thereby achieving
optimum yield (OY), defmed in the Magnuson Act as maximum sustainable yield as
modified by relevant social, economic, and ecological factors. The amendment grants
percentage shares of the annual landings quotas for ocean quahogs (Arctica islandica)
and surf clams {Spisula solidissima) to current holders of active permits for these fish-
eries. This amendment has been approved by the secretary of commerce and may be
implemented in the fall of 1990. If it is, the Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery
will be the first in federal waters to use such a direct allocation system. Similar manage-
ment strategies are being considered in other federal fisheries (e.g., NPFMC 1989a,
1989b).
Because owners of vessels will be allowed to combine quotas on fewer vessels, a
sharp decline in the number of vessels licensed for the surf clam fishery in both the mid-
Atlantic and the New England regions is anticipated as well as a possible decrease in the
number participating in the related ocean quahog fishery. Our study was done in antici-
pation of this decision and as the beginning of a social impact analysis of ITQs in an
American fishery. It was done in the context of limited entry and time constraints on
fishing activity, where large numbers of permitted vessels were allowed to work only 25
days a year. We felt that to assess the effects of a new management regime on labor, we
would have to document and account for what was happening to labor under the old
management regime.
We offer two approaches. The first method uses interviews with firm managers
and owners to explore how their labor management practices have changed in response
to sharp cutbacks in the numbers of allowable fishing days in the surf clam fishery.
The second derives from a large project on job satisfaction in the fisheries, and looks
at the situation of crew members, hired captains, and owners in a comparative per-
spective. Neither approach is adequate to the task of discerning and interpreting the
changing situations of labor in the fishery and the nature of the labor process. How-
ever, our job satisfaction analysis contributes to an understanding of barriers (and
motivators) to mobility across occupations, within the fisheries, and between fishing
and other occupations. And our interviews about crewing gave us access both to data
unavailable anywhere else and to the firm managers' interpretations of their situations
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labor process; that is, the effects of change on the nature of work and the behavior and
attitudes of workers.
The Sea Clam Fishery and Management System
The sea clam fishery of the mid-Atlantic region of the United States involves two spe-
cies: surf clams and ocean quahogs, both of which are harvested with large vessels and
hydraulic dredges and processed into canned and frozen products. For technological and
gastronomic reasons, surf clams have been more valuable than ocean quahog and were
exploited earlier and at a higher rate. The commercial fishery began in the 1940s, and
clear signs of overfishing were evident by the 1960s. Surf clams are found within state
waters (within 3 miles of the coast) but also beyond, and commercial densities of surf
clams are found in waters adjoining the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. Accordingly, the fishery was
difficult to regulate until 1977 when federal fisheries jurisdiction over waters 3 to 200
miles from shore was established.
The mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery has been intensively managed
by federal and state governments since 1976-1977 (Nicholls 1985; MAFMC 1986a). In
1977 a vessel moratorium was imposed on the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery of the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ, 3-200 miles), and since then an average of 128 vessels
has been engaged in this fishery, although 142 are licensed for it (as of 1987). The
original fishery management plan (FMP) was conceived as an emergency response to the
long-term decimation of important clam stocks and to the effects of a short term anoxic
event that affected major clam beds off the New Jersey coast in 1976. The state of New
Jersey also created a management system for the surf clam fishery within its waters.
Regulation of the ocean quahog fishery, which takes place in federal waters, involves
only an overall quota and logbook reporting requirements; this fishery has been an
important alternative to surf clamming for many of the larger vessels in the fleet as well
as vessels never engaged in surf clamming.
The 1977 FMP for surf clams and ocean quahogs caught in the EEZ also established
quotas. The surf clam quota, allocated in quarterly segments in a complicated system
administered by the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
has remained roughly the same since 1977. The clam populations have been restored to
fairly high levels of abundance and quality although they are based on only two strong
year-classes. Catch per unit of effort has therefore increased, helped also by dramatic
improvements in the catching efficiency of the vessels since 1977.
Management had two goals: (1) to rebuilt the stocks; and (2) to prevent further
overcapitalization and perhaps reduce the level of capitalization in the industry. The
1977 management system and its successive amendments helped nature do the former
but failed miserably at the latter. Vessels race to get the limited quota each quarter, and
owners and crew-members do their best to improve catching efficiency to this end.
The major debate in the 1980s is how to change the management system to better
deal with the fact that 133 vessels (as of 1987) are active in the surf clam fishery but
fewer than one-tenth of that number could easily take the entire year's quota (see Surf
Clam Task Force 1986). The quota can be reached very quickly and by very few vessels.
But because 142 vessels have permits to compete in this limited entry fishery, the quota
is in fact spread among large numbers.' The quota is handled in quarterly chunks, and in
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so that production is spread out over the entire year to help processors manage labor and
inventories.^
Overcapitalization, Vessel Consolidation, and Crews
Overcapitalization was worsened by the management system, a fact well documented
and the major argument for changing the system (Strand, Kirkley, and McConnell 1981;
Keifer and Freese 1981; Freese 1985; Nicholls 1985; MAFMC 1986b; see also Rettig
1984; Turgeon 1985; McCay and Creed 1990). Members of government agencies, man-
agement councils, the scientific community, and industry involved in surf clam and
ocean quahog management have come to an agreement on a system that will reduce the
number of vessels involved through ITQs similar in broad outline to those developed for
New Zealand (Crothers 1988). The agreement, approved by the secretary of commerce
in March 1990, is known as Amendment #8 of the Fishery Management Plan for surf
clams and ocean quahogs (MAFMC 1988). Depending on the future economics of clam-
ming, the fleet may be reduced dramatically in size within a short period, solving the
overcapitalization problem. How will that affect labor? In this article we address the
question retrospectively, asking about past changes in labor practices and posing hypoth-
eses for the future.
We report on findings about employment issues in the harvesting sector from field
research done between 1984 and 1987. The first section, based on interview work,
concerns changes in labor or crewing strategies on the part of managers of fishing firms
(vessel or fieet owners and fleet managers) as they try to adjust to management restric-
tions on the amount of time allowed for surf clamming in mid-Atlantic waters. We
observe the extent to which firm managers have responded to management-induced and
market-induced problems by reducing the number of people employed to work on the
clam boats. One strategy is known as "crew consolidation," or using crew members on
more than one boat. The other is diversification, or moving into other fisheries.
Crew consolidation and diversification occur in a situation in which firm managers
are not allowed to reduce the number of boats they use without losing access to rights to
fish for surf clams (today in the form of rights to a predetermined number of fishing
days). The situation will change with Amendment #8, which will allow managers to use
their quota allocations on however many vessels they choose.
It is thus critical to identify the people potentially affected as well as trends in labor
that already exist. The second point addressed is who are the crew-members. Who are
the captains, mates, and deckhands who work on the surf clam and ocean quahog dredge
boats? What are their alternatives and preferences? Fishery management plans rarely
answer these questions, and at best provide employment statistics for coastal counties
that are next to useless, particularly in highly urbanized areas where fisheries employ-
ment is probably a tiny fraction of countywide employment. Results of a survey done in
1984-1985 allow us to depict crew characteristics and the structure of their job satisfac-
tion in comparison with crew members in other fisheries and in relation to other work
opportunities.
Fishing Firm Strategies: Labor Consolidation and Fishery Diversification
Reliable data are not available on aggregate changes in employment in the fishing indus-
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personal interviews with data from NMFS license files to create information on the
employment patterns of 98 vessels as of September 1987. These data, and assessments of
vessel owners interviewed, suggest that vessel owners are responding to market- and
management-induced problems in the surf clam fishery by both diversifying their fish-
eries and consolidating crews.
Crew Consolidation
Labor—usually paid on a share basis—is a major cost of operation in fishing. To the cost
of the shares given to deckhands, mates, and hired captains must be added the premiums
for liability insurance, which have risen greatly since the early 1980s. Adding the fact of
a soft market for surf clams and ocean quahogs, particularly since the summer of 1986,
one can see that vessel owners and managers are interested in lowering labor costs. One
way this can be done is to improve labor efficiency through mechanization of the fishing
operation, e.g., larger vessels that have adopted conveyor belt sorting and culling of
clams. Another is to rotate workers among different boats (what we usually mean by
crew consolidation).
Further incentives to reduce employment come from the management system itself.
Adjusting quarterly quotas to the fact of rising catch per unit effort, the regional director
of the NMFS Northeast regional office has had to reduce the number of allowable surf
clam trips and hours per trip. For much of the period 1981-1984 vessels were allowed to
fish 24, and then 12 hours per week, a severe limitation to a fishery in which vessels
worked four or five days a week before 1977. The vessel owners whom we interviewed
pointed out that incentives to consolidate crews (using a deckhand, mate, or captain on
more than one vessel in a fieet) increased in response to the major reduction in fishing
time that began in 1984. By May 1985 catch rates were so high that vessels could go out
only six hours every other week, and in most of 1987 vessels were allowed to dredge for
clams six hours every third week (see MAFMC 1988: 98). Before long surf clammers
(but not ocean quahoggers) were allowed only 6 hours a week, and then 6 hours every
other week, and extended closures were effected, all in response to the hefty increase in
catching efficiency of the mid-Atlantic surf clam vessels.
The trend of crew consolidation increased when the price of surf clams dropped in
response to the discovery of surf clams in New York inshore waters in 1986, as well as
landings from New England waters. This "feeding frenzy" resulted in a glut and a
drop in the price of surf clams, while at the same time the number of allowable trips
was reduced even more. In 1987 mid-Atlantic surf clam permit holders (which in-
cludes about six vessels from New England) made as few as 25 trips per year in that
fishery.
Given the long periods in which vessels are not allowed to work in the mid-
Atlantic surf clam fishery and the appreciable cost of labor, one would expect that
owners of two or more vessels would begin running both with some or all of the same
crew. This reduces the owner's costs by (1) reducing the number of people on the
payroll; (2) making it possible to select for the more productive, more reliable, and
less injury-prone workers; and (3) lowering liability insurance premiums. In addition,
owners may be forced to consolidate because of the difficulty of finding someone
reliable to work on a vessel when the vessel goes out very seldom and if the price of
clams is low as was true in 1987. Many vessel owners said this was happening, but we
tried to substantiate what they said by investigating data they provided and what we
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The Fall 1987 Interview Sample
In August and September 1987, we carried out a survey of surf clam and ocean quahog
owners in the major mid-Atlantic ports (from Point Pleasant, NJ in the north, to Oyster,
VA in the south). We talked with vessel owners, managers, and other representatives of
25 firms, partnerships, and sole-owner enterprises that owned 74% (98) of the 133
vessels active in the mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery during 1987. The sample represents
the full range of ownership types and fieet sizes in the industry. A major socioeconomic
and cultural distinction found in this fishery is between vertically integrated fieets (pro-
cessors) and fieets and individual boats that are not owned by processors (independents).
Table 1 shows the number of firms in our sample and the sizes of their fieets broken
down by ownership category.
Each clam vessel requires from three to five crew, depending on its size, the num-
ber of dredges operated, and management preferences. Since we are interested in the
extent to which firm managers move crew members among their vessels (rather than
hiring a full crew for each vessel), the appropriate unit of analysis is the firm, not the
vessel. By firms, we mean the identifiable owners or groups of owners of vessels,
whether corporations, partnerships, or sole-owner enterprises.
In personal and telephone interviews, we asked firm managers—identified with the
help of fishermen and NMFS—about the number of people actually working for their
fieets, including hired captains and mates, as distinct from the number of crew used per
vessel. We refer to this figure as the number of hired crew. We also asked how many
owners work regularly on one or more boats. Combining these figures gives the total
crew working on the firm's vessels, which when divided by the number of vessels yields
the total average labor force per vessel.^ Table 2 includes these data by type of firm.
For the overall sample of 25 firms, the average fieet size was 3.9 vessels per firm,
the average number of hired crew was 12.6, the average total crew (employees plus
working owners) was 13.3, the average hired crew per vessel was 3.4, and the average
total crew was 3.8. The difference between hired crew and total crew is important
among the independents, but not among the processor firms. Whereas independent own-
Table 1
Sample by Firm Types, Fall
1987 Interviews
Firm Type Enterprises Vessels"
Vertically Integrated Fleets* 5 (19.2%) 44 (44.9%)
(2-16 vessels)
Independent Fleets (2-14 vessels) 8 (30.8%) 42 (42.9%)
One Vessel per Enterprise 12(46.1%) 12(12.2%)
Total 25 98
"Vessels = No. of vessels actually operating in the fall of 1987. A few
others are tied up, hence not manned.
*Fleet = Defmition of fleets is taken from respondents. In some cases, the
individual enterprises are in fact interwoven in terms of ownership, but are
described as belonging to certain individuals. A set of five vessels that are
registered to five closely related men may be considered a fieet by
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ers often captain one or another of their vessels, none of the owners of the five vertically
integrated firms in the sample work regularly on their vessels.
Comparison of Interview and NMFS Data
The U,S, Coast Guard and NMFS collect data on the number of crew per vessel in their
routine registration and licensing of vessels over 5 GRT capacity. Their numbers refer to
the usual number of positions on each boat, not to the number of people who fill those
positions. Thus, one measure of the extent to which surf clam and ocean quahog firms
are reducing labor costs by having individuals work on the crews of two or more vessels
is to compare the average number of crew positions on a boat according to the NMFS
license data with the average number actually working per boat according to our inter-
view data.
We had data on crew size (including captain) from both our interviews and NMFS
licenses for 19 firms. For comparability, we averaged the NMFS data on number of
crew positions per vessel and reduced the data to 19 clusters corresponding to the
separate firms. The NMFS data show a mean of 4.611 positions per boat, whereas our
interview data show a mean of 3.747 actual people per boat. This difference is statisti-
cally significant (p > .05, one-way ANOVA). In other words, there are fewer people
manning the boats than there are positions on the boats, nearly one full crew member
less per boat. This supports the hypothesis that firm managers have responded to
cutbacks in allowable fishing time and rising insurance rates by consolidating crews.
The measure is imperfect. The NMFS data we used are not updated each year.
Consequently, the difference may also refiect overall reduction in average crew size over
time resulting from mechanization of the deck work. However, this too would be an
indicator of reduction in the use of labor.
A final point is that crew consolidation seems to vary by the type of firm (see Table
2). Vessels that are part of independent fieets tend to have smaller crews than either
processor-owned vessels or individually owned vessels. The average total crew (employ-
ees plus working owners) per vessel in the independent fleets is 3.2, whereas it is 4,05
for the processor fieets. (Average total crew is 4.1 for individually owned vessels, but
they cannot easily consolidate crew size by rotating individuals among boats). This
suggests that owners of independent fieets are making greater use of the crew consolida-
tion strategy than are processor-owners, perhaps because they have less opportunity to
diversify into other fisheries, as we will discuss later.
Diversification: Ocean Quahogging and the New Jersey Inshore Fisheries
Our study shows that crew consolidation has been substantial, but harvesting firm man-
agers have also responded to cutbacks in allowable fishing time and other economic
pressures by using their crews and clams vessels to engage in other fisheries, albeit
within the sea clam industry. Many captains and owners told us that retaining their crews
required involvement in ocean quahogging, which is essentially an open access fishery
because market demand has not yet pushed catch rates to the level of the quota, and in
the New Jersey inshore surf clam fishery, a highly restricted fishery that is allowed from
November to May.
Crew size is significantly correlated (p < .01) with whether or not a vessel is or has
recently been ocean quahogging. This effect in our sample is intensified by the fact that
most vessels in one of the largest fleets had begun ocean quahogging in 1985-1986,318 B. J. McCay, J. B. Gatewood, and C. F. Creed
Table 2
Summary Data on Crew Size, Surf Clam, and Ocean Quahog Firms




















































































































Note. Participation in Quahogging determined by Whether Quahogs Landed 1985-1986 or Informant Report
of Quahogging in 1987,
"Crew = Deckhands, mates, captains who work on board the vessel.
*Total Crew = Crew plus owner(s) who work on board the vessel. There may be several owners per firm (up
to four in this sample) who also work on the vessel,
''Fleets = Group of vessels with one owner, not vertically integrated with processing. Individuals = Vessels
owned by firms with no other vessels and no processing firms. Processors = Vertically integrated fleets.
helping to maintain employment in that fleet, and these vessels were among the largest in
the fishery.
Both vessel size and participation in ocean quahogging are positively correlated with
crew size. Indeed, vessel size itself is an important determinant of crew size. It is neither
possible nor sensible to distinguish the weight of these factors. Because of small num-
bers we cannot statisfically separate them. And the infiuences have an essential circular-
ity that statistical manipulation would do little to change. Ocean quahogging requires
more seaworthy vessels than does surf clamming, i.e. large vessels. On the other hand,
investment in a larger vessel may force one to engage in ocean quahogging as well as
surf clamming to pay off the bills.Labor and Sea Clam Management 319
If a vessel with a mid-Atlantic EEZ surf clam permit also engages in ocean quahog-
ging, its fishing time is greatly extended. The owners we talked with emphasized this
factor; a vessel without a market for ocean quahogs cannot support a full-time crew and,
indeed, is likely to experience difficulty attracting and keeping reliable crew members
when they are needed. Whether a vessel is used for ocean quahogging or not depends on
several things including its size and seaworthiness (ocean quahogs are usually found in
commercial quantities in deeper and more distant waters than are surf clams) and
whether the owner has a buyer for the ocean quahogs caught. There are, of course, other
determinants of crew size including whether two dredges are used, whether a stem rig or
side rig outfit, whether sorting is done mechanically, etc.
The New Jersey inshore surf clam fishery, which takes place from November to
May, provides an alternative for the smaller vessels that are less well suited to ocean
quahogging, but participation in this fishery has a much lower impact on average crew
size than does ocean quahogging. One obvious intervening variable is the size of the
vessel. The smaller vessels are more likely to be in the Jersey inshore fishery in the
winter months and are also, given their smaller size, likely to have smaller crews.
Another alternative is a fishery for surf clams on Georges Bank, off the coast of New
England. A few vessels, mostly owned by large processors, are engaged in this fishery
from time to time but distance from port and from markets make it unattractive to
most.
Discussion: Diversity and Flexibility
Diversification into the ocean quahog fishery and the New Jersey inshore surf clam
fishery are ways to keep capital and labor profitably employed. Diversification is a
strategy the success of which depends on the market, that is price and the relative
bargaining power of buyers and sellers. Marketing surf clams and ocean quahogs was a
big problem for independent clammers by the summer of 1987. There was a glut on the
market, and processors changed some of their purchasing conditions, i.e. requiring that
clams (ocean quahogs) be brought to the docks at the processing firms rather than
trucked. Some also increased use of their own vessels to harvest clams."*
One result was sharp reduction in the market for ocean quahogs caught by many of
the independents. Another was increased selling and buying of vessels, restructuring
ownership patterns. A third was the beginning of a search for other fisheries. A few of
the owners who have no market for ocean quahogs and are not in the New Jersey inshore
fishery had begun to outfit for or explore the possibility of scalloping and finfish drag-
ging by 1987. They had reached the critical point of not being able to maintain even a
small cadre of deckhands and captains without finding alternatives to mid-Atlantic surf
clamming.
A decision by the regional director of NMFS in early 1987 to allow more fiexible
choice of days for mid-Atlantic surf clam trips (known as "pick your days") bought time
for those caught in this bind: for the first time in many years, it became both desirable
and possible to explore alternatives to either surf clamming or ocean quahogging. Be-
fore, firm managers had little fiexibility because allowable fishing days were spread out
over the year to meet processors' desires for steady supply. A few firms have developed
nonclamming alternatives since 1987. The costs of gear change (i.e. for otter trawls or320 B. J. McCay, J. B. Gatewood, and C. F Creed
scallop dredges) are high; moreover, finding markets for other fisheries is not easy
either. And the owner must be prepared to invest time and money and find markets, and
his captain and crew must acquire the skills and specialized knowledge necessary to
succeed in a new fishery.
The recent change allowing vessel owners to choose their own clamming days let
vessel owners better coordinate their crews to work on several vessels. The "pick your
days" system provides flexibility in this and other ways, including the possibility of
obtaining reduced insurance rates by tying up a vessel for an extended period of time.
However, flexibility of the independents is limited by their dependence on buyers of
clams, a dependency that increases when demand is low, as in recent years characterized
by inventory gluts.
Reducing the number of hired crew also has the potential of helping owners deal
with rising insurance costs, which many feel have risen for this industry partly because
of higher risks occasioned by the race to catch as many surf clams as possible within a
limited time, i.e. 6 hours every two or three weeks. Owners and managers can select for
the more reliable and less injury-prone crew.
Our analysis does not suggest a major reduction in crew employment for the indus-
try as a whole with decline in the number of allowable fishing days in the mid-Atlantic
surf clam fishery. Ocean quahogging, in particular, has maintained a fairly high demand
for able-bodied deckhands and skilled mates and captains in some sectors of the industry.
However, crew consolidation is taking place. The need to reduce labor seems to be
concentrated among the independent fleets and the individuals who lack access to the
ocean quahog fishery and who are reducing crew employment as one way to manage in
relatively difficult times.
The consequences of crew consolidation strategies may also be particularly prob-
lematic for people who usually are employed as captains and those who aspire to that
position. Many of our informants told us that the major consolidation of labor has been
in the use of captains. Our data do not allow us to separate captains from other crew in
analyses of crew size. However, a separate study of job satisfaction, discussed later,
showed that the hired captains in the sea clamming fleet were often the ones most
dependent on sea clamming, in terms of ranges of experience and degree of reliance on
sea clamming for an income.
Crew-Members and Their Alternatives
The Job Satisfaction Survey, 1984-1985
A study of job satisfaction in New Jersey fisheries adds another approach to employment
statistics and our crewing study in helping to interpret the employment situation of sea
clammers and hence the social impact of changes in the industry, including management-
induced changes, that may reduce labor needs. In 1984 and 1985, as part of a larger
study (Gatewood and McCay 1988, 1989, 1990), we interviewed 68 sea clammers who
worked on boats based in New Jersey ports. Twenty-nine were deckhands, 14 mates, 15
hired captains, and 10 were owners who also captained the vessel.
The New Jersey sea-clammers we interviewed are central to and fairly representa-
tive of fishermen in the larger mid-Atlantic sea clam fishery. More surf clams and ocean
quahogs are landed by New Jersey vessels than by vessels from other states. We lack
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have spent several months engaged in fieldwork interviews with owners, captains, and
crews from these ports. We are confident that the differences, if any, in educational
background, ethnicity, or access to alternative employment opportunities are not impor-
tant. Sea clam crewmen in all regions tend to be white Americans of Western European
extraction, with something close to a high school education, and background and some
experience in mostly blue collar work besides fishing. Although alternative land-based
employment is scarce in the southern states, the mobility of crewmen is high within the
fisheries. In the larger job satisfaction study we found that 26.4% of the 401 N.J.
fishermen we interviewed originally came from other mid-Atlantic states (Gatewood and
McCay 1988: 107).
The vessels in the sample are representative of the industry at large in terms of
length and tonnage as well as enterprise type (McCay, Creed, and Gatewood 1987).
The media length was 75 feet (range 54-125 feet) and media tonnage (gross registered
tons) was 121 (range 37 to 194). About half the respondents were associated with
owner-operated or small fieet operations (two or three vessels owned by the same
person or family), and the rest worked in the context of large and vertically integrated
fieets.
Our job satisfaction study showed that sea clamming is, for some, a highly treasured
way of life, for others the only thing they know, and for most clammers, the most
remunerative—and satisfying—of the work opportunities available to them given their
levels of education, training, and experience.
The sea clammers in tiie 1984-1985 study were, on the average, fairly well edu-
cated and thus adaptable in a changing employment market: in the 1984-1985 study, 12
years of school was the median, 11.3 the average, for the sample (McCay, Creed, and
Gatewood 1987) They are relatively young on tiie average: tiieir median age in 1984-
1985 was 30, with a range of 19-62. They are also, more than on the average, family
men: 72.1% are married, and they have an average of 1.8 children. These data do not
include information on past marriages and separations; the industry is known for high
divorce rates. Making major changes is more disruptive for those who are married and
with children than those not and without, but it can also be argued that clammers who
are married are more likely to have a second source of income in the household (unfortu-
nately we lack data on this question).
Although participation in surf-clamming has been severely limited by the manage-
ment system, very few clammers are part-timers. Fishing was the major, for most the
only, source of income for sea clammers in this study. Eighty-five percent said that they
were dependent on fishing for three-quarters or more of their income (the highest choice
we offered), and most of these added the comment either verbally or on tiie interview
form that all of their income came from fishing. The hired members of the crew-
deckhands, mates, and hired captains—are more dependent on fishing than are the own-
ers, some of whom have other income-producing investments. Hired captains all said
that they depended on fishing for three-quarters or more of their income; over 85% of
the deckhands and mates also said this.
Over the past decade of limited entry management, sea clammers have become
accustomed to relatively good incomes from fishing for surf clams and ocean quahogs.
Although we have no reason to believe that surf clammers are more likely than the
general population to volunteer full and accurate information about their incomes to
outsiders doing surveys, our income data are consistent with other sources of informa-
tion and are particularly meaningful when compared with answers to the same question
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than do regular crew (deckhands) and mates. Incomes have reportedly declined for some
participants in the sea clam fishery since 1985, because of market problems, but sea
clammers, whether deckhands, mates, or captains, make higher incomes on the average
than do people in other mid-Atlantic fisheries (Table 3).
Moreover, our job satisfaction study shows that sea-clammers tend to be "in it for
the money." On the average and much more so than people in other fisheries, sea
clammers were more satisfied with the financial rewards of their work than with other
dimensions of it (adventure, work schedules, opportunity to be own boss, etc.) (Gate-
wood and McCay 1988, 1989, 1990). They are less likely to fmd other fisheries to their
liking.
Most clammers had been involved in other fisheries in the past, but few wished to
make a switch from sea clamming to one of those others. Twenty-one out of the 24
captains reported experience in fishing other than sea clamming. The captains inter-
viewed, all then working out of New Jersey ports, named these as their other fisheries:
finfish dragging, quahogging (people often distinguished between surf clamming and
ocean quahogging in that study in 1984-1985), scalloping, pot fishing (for lobsters,
some sea bass), gill-netting, longlining (for swordfish, tuna, tilefish), bay clamming,
work on party and charter boats, bay crabbing and eeling, catching mussels, and oyster-
ing. In other words, they have been involved in the full range of mid-Atlantic fisheries
as well as fisheries in other regions such as Gulf Coast shrimping and Alaskan king crab
fishing.
The other fisheries in which mates and deckhands in this study have worked are
almost identical to those named by captains except that mates and deckhands were much
more likely to have been involved in sea scalloping and bay clamming. Mates and
deckhands are far more dependent than captains on sea clamming in terms of past
experience: 10 out of 40 (25%) had done no other kind of fishing (McCay, Creed, and
Gatewood 1987).
Although people have participated in another fishery, they may or may not like the
one they are in or prefer it to another choice. We asked respondents which was their
favorite fishery and why. Relating current fishery to choice of favorite fishery, we found
that 75 % of the sea clammers in the study chose sea clamming as their favorite, typically
because of the money to be made (1984, when most of these interviews were done, was
near the end of a boom period in the industry). This level of contentedness among
participants in the sea clam fishery is moderately high: oystermen and scallopers were
Table 3
Fishing Income by Fishery,
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Table 4
Type of Work Other than Fishing with Which Informant







































































Note. The specific occupations held by participants in this study are: roofer, carpenter,
painter, welder, machinist, well driller, diesel mechanic, plumbing, masonry, draftsman,
hydraulics, electrician, landscaper, bulkheading, fish packing, custom steel fabricator, boat
repair, cabinetmaker, maintenance engineer, logger, firewood cutter, house painter, bartender,
cook, waiter/busboy, boat captain, taxi cab driver, truck driver, heavy equipment operator,
motel manager, campground manager, bar owner, race track outrider, road maintenance, radio
announcer, photography, aerial advertisement; work in cranberry industry, farming, and
logging,
far more likely to choose other fisheries as their favorite (only 44% and 36% respec-
tively chose oystering or scalloping), while baymen (clammers, crabbers, etc.),
longliner fishermen, and draggermen were close to but somewhat higher than the sea
clammers (79%, 83%, and 82% respectively) (Gatewood and McCay 1988). The dis-
contents among the sea clammers chose finfish dragging, longlining, lobstering, scallop-
ing, gillnetting, and trolling, in that order, as their favorites.'
Over 85% of the sea clammer respondents in the 1984-1985 study had done work
besides fishing (McCay, Creed and Gatewood 1987), and the hired captains were the
least likely to have had other work experience or, conversely, the most dependent on
fishing. New Jersey sea clammers have a wide range of nonfishing work experience and
background, primarily in blue-collar occupations. Almost 30% of the respondents had
fathers who were mainly fishermen; the other major categories are laborers and crafts-
men, generally the blue collar occupations. None had fathers who could be classified as
professional, and very few (5.9%) had fathers with managerial positions. The respon-
dents themselves fit this pattern. Like their fathers, most of the sea clammers have been
in the blue collar occupations, as laborers and craftsmen, as well as the service occupa-
tions (Table 4).
We asked fishermen to compare nonfishing jobs they had with their current fishing
work. The sea clammers emphasized the money to be made in sea clamming in compari-
son with other jobs they have had and were generally satisfied with sea clamming, but
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Table 5
Estimates of Nonfishing Economic Opportunity by Fishery,
New Jersey Job Satisfaction Study
Item Clam Scallop Oyster Dragger Longline Bay F F Prob.
Time to find other work
Time to find work you enjoy
as much as present fishing
"Psychic cost" of not fishing
(B-A)
Note: Scale = (1) a few days to (5) never.
work itself and time for other activities (Gatewood and McCay 1988, 1989, 1990). We
also asked fishermen how long they thought it would take to fmd (A) another job, and
(B) another job they liked as well as their current fishery. The scale was (1) a few days;
(2) a few weeks; (3) a few months; (4) a year of longer; (5) never (you could not do
anything else). As seen in Table 5, the sea clammers expressed some optimism about
finding other work (average 1.71 on the scale) but less for fmding work as enjoyable as
surf clamming/ocean quahogging (average 2.95 on the scale). We computed a psychic
cost of not fishing, in terms of the difference between the time it would take to find a job
and the time it would take to find a job the respondent likes as much as fishing, and
found that for all fisheries in the study there is a considerable difference. In a separate
analysis, not shown here, we arrayed these data by status (captain, first mate, crew), and
found that this psychic cost was significantly higher for captains and first mates than for
crew (deckhands) (Gatewood and McCay 1988).
Summary Description of New Jersey Sea Clammers
In summary, sea clammers ranging from captains to deckhands prefer to remain in the
surf clam and/or ocean quahog fisheries but have a very wide range of experience in
mid-Atlantic and other fisheries. Sea clammers also have varied experience in nonfish-
ing work. Their experience is primarily in the service, labor, and craftsman catego-
ries. When comparing previous work with present fishing, sea clammers, on the aver-
age, said that other work was unlikely to give the same income satisfaction, and that it
would take longer to find a job that provided that satisfaction. This varies with crew
status. Captains and mates derive the most satisfaction from sea clamming and would
suffer the most if forced to quit. Hired (nonowner) captains may be the most vulnera-
ble: not only do they derive high levels of satisfaction from sea clamming, but they are
less likely than members of other status groups to have experience in nonfishing work.
Mates, deckhands, and hired captains are all more dependent on clamming for a living
than are owner captains, and mates and deckhands have had less experience in other
fisheries.
These findings will have to be placed against information on regional and local
labor markets to predict the impacts of changes in employment in sea clamming. There
may, in the short term, be no economic problem at all for deckhands, mates, and hired
captains who are looking for other work. The problem may be more that of firm
managers in finding deckhands, mates, and hired captains to work under the conditions
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rural areas report difficulty finding reliable people to work on the boats (and in pro-
cessing) because of competition for labor with other employers, even in the seasonal,
high unemployment counties. Recent discussions with crewmen indicate that those
who cannot be assured steady employment by fieet owners or on a quahog vessel have
found other employment and use their sporadic surf clam trips as a way to make extra
money.
The major problem for crew-members is, rather, the one addressed in our job
satisfaction study: finding a job one likes as well as or better than sea clamming. In that
study what people liked most of all was the chance to make good money, and thus the
attractiveness of surf clamming and ocean quahogging compared with alternatives is
changeable, depending on economic conditions and the power of labor both within and
without the industry.
Data collected on the other fishing and nonfishing work experiences of sea clam-
mers show a high level of participation in other mid-Atlantic fisheries. Most clammers
have been involved in other fisheries but few wish (or wished in 1984-1985, when most
of the sea clammers were interviewed) to make a switch. Sea clamming is, for some, a
highly treasured way of life, for others the only thing they know, and for most clammers
the most remunerative, and satisfying, of the work opportunities available to them given
their levels of education, training, and experience. Relatively few (one-quarter) of those
surveyed preferred another fishery; in descending order of preference were finfish drag-
ging, longlining, lobstering, scalloping, gillnetting, and trolling. None of these is, at
present, a growing fishery in the mid-Atlantic; all are in greater or lesser degrees of
trouble. Accordingly, switching to another fishery will not be easy for those who choose
or are forced to leave sea clamming.
Conclusions
We learned that mid-Atlantic surf clam vessel owners are both diversifying and cutting
back on labor costs through crew consolidation in response to difficulties in the sea clam
industry within the framework of limited entry management. The latter may displace
some crew members. However, vessel owners are diversifying and consolidating crews
also in response to labor shortages; it is difficult to get and keep good crew members
(deckhands, mates, and hired captains) when the boat goes out very seldom, especially
when there is also uncertainty about the market for clams. We also learned much more
about crews and the industry. We have not formalized our analysis into a schematic
model but we are prepared to make predictions from it.
Predictions
We offer predictions for how a new management regime, based on direct and transfer-
able allocations of a quota to vessel owners, will affect labor. The predictions are based
on (1) what we learned from the interviews discussed; (2) general assumptions about the
profit-maximizing behavior of optimizing firms; (3) our understanding of how the crew
members are likely to behave, based on our job satisfaction study; (4) what people
involved in the industry and the management system tell us will happen; and (5) observa-
tion of the management process and informal interviews and participant-observation with
members of the industry.
First, although surf clam vessel crews have already been consolidated by fieet own-326 B. J. McCay, J. B. Gatewood, and C. E Creed
ers not using these vessels for ocean quahogging or inshore clamming, fleet consolida-
tion of labor will accelerate. Increased crew consolidation and more layoffs will follow
implementation of ITQs or any other plan amendments that allow owners of fleets of
clam boats to combine on fewer boats the allowable fishing days, shares of the quota, or
other rights or privileges created through the management processes. There may be
some movement of vessels, and hence crews, into other fisheries. However, the morato-
rium system of management encouraged retention of old vessels in the fleet, and it is
likely that when many of those vessels are retired from the sea clam fishery they will not
be used for other fisheries.
In any case there will be fewer positions for crew members on sea clamming boats.
Perhaps one-third of the surf clam vessel crewmen will lose their jobs within a year or so
of the new regime. Those crew members who leave, if they are like those we studied in
1984-1985, have experience in other fisheries and jobs and are likely to be in regions
with relatively low unemployment rates in the northern part of the mid-Atlantic (McCay
and Creed 1987). Most will initially look for work that is related to fishing, either
crewing on other types of vessels or doing dock work. They may, however, have trouble
finding jobs that pay as well for little education and training, and that provide as much
satisfaction (which, for sea-clammers, is about the same as good pay) as has sea-
clamming.
If the system results in sharp reduction of vessels, a relatively small number of
vessels and people will be sharing the resource rent that is captured by a limited entry
system of management. Crew-members who stay on may prosper even more than they
have within the vessel moratorium, but it is as possible that owners will readjust the
share system to enhance their profits or maintain their positions within an increasingly
competitive industry.* We predict that the crew who remain on surf clam vessels will
work longer hours and have higher incomes than during the period from late 1986 to
present. Surf clam vessel owners will readjust the share system so they can capture a
higher percentage of the profits from their more efficient vessels. They will be able to do
so because of the scarcity of employment in the fishery and the relatively high income it
offers.
Ocean quahog vessels should not operate any differently than they do now, because
current management rules do not restrict the number of trips they can take. Under the
new regime market demand, vessel maintenance requirements, and the density and loca-
tion of ocean quahog beds will dictate the number and length of trips taken by ocean
quahog vessels. The next major change in this fishery, based on industry comments at
the amendment hearings and at Surf Clam committee and council meetings, will be
shucking at sea, which may result in new labor arrangements and relationships to capital
and management.
Bringing Crews and Labor into the Management Process
We have examined selected features of crewing and crews in the harvesting sector of the
surf clam and ocean quahog industry of the mid-Atlantic region of the United States and
made predictions about the impacts of a new management regime. Our analysis, which
will be expanded in the future to include labor in the processing sector, is also intended
to bring questions concerning labor into public debates about allocating rights to com-
mon resources. Our concluding remarks concem why, at least in the mid-Atlantic sea-
clam fishery, the issue of what will happen to labor has not been part of those public
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In the numerous reports, discussions, and meetings of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council, its committees, and other groups, concerns about the effects of
changes in the management system have dealt almost exclusively with two major social
groups in the fishery: vessel owners and processors. Two other important social groups
have been invisible: crew-members (including hired captains) and workers in processing
firms. Crew-members and processing plant workers have had litde say and virtually no
attention given to them in the debate over how to amend the management system even
though they are the ones whose lives may be most dramatically altered.
Crew members and crewing issues are seemingly invisible to most deliberations on
fishery management in the United States. The invisibility of labor issues may be particu-
lar to certain conditions and fisheries. For example, where fishing enterprises are sel-
dom structured by kinship and close friendship ties, and where vessel operators are as
likely to be hired captains as owners of the vessels, the divergence of interests of labor
and management or capital is more obvious, and owners cannot be relied on to represent
their crew members in the management arena. These conditions apply to the mid-
Atlantic region's sea clam fisheries, where kinship is not the dominant connection be-
tween people on a boat' and owner-operators, although numerous, control only part of
the vessels in the fishery. According to our findings, as of December 1987, 47% of the
142 licensed surf clam vessels (and an even higher share of catching power) were owned
by six firms, of which four were vertically integrated companies. Buying and selling of
vessels has been intense in subsequent years (we use 1987 as the cut-off date for this
study but are following the management process in other research), but the pattern
remains of an industry dominated by a few large firms, some vertically integrated and
some not. In such fisheries crew members are not always able to depend on the owners,
or even the captains, to fully represent and even communicate with them with regard to
management policy. And because the crew members may have few ties to the owners or
the operators, they are not likely to attend management meetings.
We suspect that the lack of attention to labor questions we observe is more pervasive
in U.S. fisheries management. One reason for an extended silence on labor issues may
be that U.S. marine fisheries management is less explicitly connected with community
development and social policy issues than is management in nations such as Canada,
Norway, and Iceland where fishing is far more important within the larger economy. Nor
are many crewmen in U.S. fisheries organized in unions or other trade associations that
serve as lobbyists and communicators and also help maintain working class conscious-
ness. Another is that under the 1977 Magnuson Act, which created a decentralized,
regional system of management for fisheries from 3 to 2(X) miles from the coastal
baseline, it is possible for interest group politics to be dominated by a few large firms so
that the interests of vessel owners and seafood processors are usually more explicitly
addressed than those of the captains, mates, deckhands, and processing plant employees
who work for them. In addition, administration of the Magnuson Act has been such that
adequate social impact analyses need not be done for fishery management plans to be
approved (Fricke 1985). Those that are done suffer from the lack of adequate data on
labor practices, patterns, and opportunities. NMFS collects very little data on either
harvesting or processing labor. Aggregate U.S. Census and Department of Labor data on
employment and unemployment for coastal counties and even municipalities rarely iden-
tify fishermen.
For these and other reasons, although the issue of the effects of a particular
management regime on labor and employment opportunities is recognized in discus-
sions of social impacts and mandated in FMPs, it rarely appears in either formal328 B. J. McCay, J. B. Gatewood, and C. E Creed
deliberations of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council or the impact analyses
in its FMPs. This is particularly unfortunate when management alternatives have the
intended or unintended consequence of reducing employment and changing the labor
process in a fishery.
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Notes
t. In 1987 there were 142 permitted vessels for the mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery but only
133 actually landing surf clams; this pattern is typical, as some vessels are laid up for various
reasons and others are used for ocean quahogging.
2. In 1987 fishermen were given more choice about when they worked (see page 319).
3. It was difficult to obtain these data partly because companies did not always have readily
accessible information on the actual number of people working the vessels and partly because of
confusion regarding the difference between number of people employed and how many go out on
each vessel, i.e., the fact of crew consolidation. Where we sensed confusion might be a problem
we made one or more return telephone calls for clarification.
4. Increased vertical integration of harvesting and processing was not a response to market
glut but rather an attempt to improve reliability of supplies and, perhaps, to try to improve
positions in relation to anticipated regulatory changes.
5. The job satisfaction study was done at a time when the Atlantic sea scallop fishery was at
an all-time low. By 1989 the scallop fishery had rebounded to an all-time high. As one reviewer
notes, this change, like changes in other fisheries, may affect how people rank different fish-
eries.
6. By "increasingly competitive" we refer to the loss of management-induced protection for
smaller and older vessels. Even the old, inefficient vessels maintained value for their owners in
the system partly because they could, with the right crew, produce just about as well under the
tight restrictions of 6 hours every few weeks, but also because their permits were themselves
carriers of value in this limited entry fishery. With individual transferable quotas, value will be
more closely linked to actual jjerformance. In another sense, competition may decrease with fewer
sellers and perhaps buyers, i.e., the monopolistic scenario.
7. In our job satisfaction study we did not ask about kinship ties among members of a crew
because our units of analysis were individuals. However, we have an indirect measure of the
importance of kinship: father's main occupation. For the sea clammers in the study, only 28% had
fathers who were or are fishermen. In contrast 38% had fathers who were or are laborers,
operatives, or in the craft trades, and fathers of the rest fit into other occupational categories.Labor and Sea Clam Management 329
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